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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
contrary intent is shown in the will, a power of appointment will be
deemed exercised by a general bequest or devise or by a general re-
siduary clause.
The Cardeza decision still seems to be limited by Estate of Kerr v.
Commissioners'7 in which the Tax Court held the entire amount of the
interests taxable in the donee's estate even though the new interests,
remainders, were merely a smaller part of the default interests, estates
in fee. However, the court distinguished its decision in the Cardeza
case on the ground that there were in that case no new interests created
under the power, the appointee taking exactly what he had before the
attempted exercise of the power.
ROBERT L. HINES.
Taxation-Income-Fanily Partnerships
Great difficulty has been encountered in determining the status of
family partnerships as a means of effecting tax savings through a divi-
sion of income among the family members. Culbertson v. Commis-
sioner,1 although more favorable to the taxpayer than prior decisions
in the Tax Court, has admittedly produced greater subjectivity and con-
sequently increased uncertainty in an area already extensively litigated.
Although provision under the Revenue Act of 1948 for joint returns
of husband and wife virtually renders consideration of this type of
partnership unnecessary, the problem is still much alive in the formation
of parent-child arrangements.
An understanding of the well recognized principles governing tax
liability in these family arrangements is essential as a background to
Culbertson. Lucas v. Earl ruled that the tax burden may not be shifted
by an assignment of future income from services rendered by the assig-
nor; income is taxable to the tree which actually bore the fruit.2 As a
corollary, income from property may be taxable to the donor if he re-
donor; if the power is unexercised, the rates are based on the relationship between
the beneficiary and the donee.).
"Johnston v. Knight, 117 N. C. 122, 23 S. E. 92 (1895) (the intention of the
donee to execute the power, however manifested, will make the execution valid
and effective, and unless the contrary is shown by the testator's will a general
residuary clause will operate as an execution of the power); Taylor v. Eatman,
92 N. C. 601 (1885) ("It is not necessary to refer to the power if the act shows
that the donee had in view the subject of the power at the time.") ; see Cone v.
Commissioner, 31 B. T. A. 515, 518 (1934) (the Board says the intent to exercise
the power must come from reference to the power, direct reference to the subject
matter, or it may appear from the facts that the instrument would be inoperative
without the exercise of the power).
17 9 T. C. 359 (1947) (the fee given in default was decreased to a remainder
interest by partial appointment to a stranger, and although there was a renuncia-
tion by the appointee, he still took that particular estate under the power).
169 Sup. Ct. 1210 (1949), reversing 168 F. 2d 979 (5th Cir. 1948).
2281 U.S. 111 (1930) (future salary and attorney's fees).
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tained the substance of full enjoyment of all rights and benefits even
though he assigned the already accrued right to receive the income-
Helvering v. Horst.a Blair v. Commissioner, however, drew this dis-
tinction: when there is a recognized valid transfer of income producing
property, the income from that property must per force be taxable to
the transferee. 4 Vigilant to distinguish substance and effect from form
and method, Helvering v. Clifford refused to recognize a transfer for
tax purposes of the beneficial interest where so many strings were
retained by the donor-settlor over the trust property that the actual
dominion and control of the corpus and the ultimate beneficial use of
the income had not shifted.5 Thus Clifford asks: who controls the
production and allocation of the income?
The Earl-Horst, Clifford doctrines and the Blair rule have been
viewed as two sometimes conflicting lines of judicial reasoning. It
therefore becomes important to determine whether capital or services
is the predominant factor in the production of the firm income in order
to appreciate the applicability of these principles and the relative sig-
nificance of the various tests of partnership validity for tax purposes.
The celebrated decisions of Commissioner v. Tower8 and Lusthaus
v. Commissioner7 served to decelerate greatly recognition of family
partnerships by the Tax Court under the Internal Revenue Code.8
In both cases the wife's partnership interest was denied where a prior
gift by the husband was the basis of her capital contribution. The
transactions were viewed as superficial arrangements which did not
result in any actual change in the economic relationships in the business
or in the family. Practically, more important than what Tower and
Lusthaus said was what the Tax Court, in the ensuing months, thought
they said. The tests of original capital contribution, vital services, and,
to a lesser extent, control and management, which had been stated as
factors evincive of a business purpose, were interpreted to be conclusive.
This understandable adherence to stock tests susceptible of some degree
of certainty and objectivity" proved fatal to countless partnerships.9
'311 U.S. 112 (1940) (negotiable coupons for interest detached from bonds);
cf. Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940) (insurance renewal commissions).
'300 U.S. 5 (1937) (father's gift to his children of part of his interest in a
trust of which he was beneficiary).
309 U.S. 331 (1940) (short term trust, reversionary rights).
-327 U.S. 280 (1946) (conditional gift of stock in predecessor corporation).
7 327 U.S. 293 (1946) (gift from husband and notes payable out of her share
of profits).
'Applicable provisions are INT. REv. CoDE §§11, 22(a), 181, 182, 3797.
0 Circuit courts have been more generous to the taxpayer than the Tax Court.
This fact is even more important since the rule of Dobson v. Comm'r., 320 U.S.
489 (1943) has been repudiated by amendment to §1141(a) of INT. RFv. COD. De-
cisions of the Tax Court are now reviewable "in the same manner and to the same
extent as decisions of the district courts in civil actions tried without a jury." See
Note, 1 STAN. L. REv. 305 (1949).
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In Culbertson, therefore, the Court was confronted with the task of
correcting misdirected emphasis. At the insistence of a partner bowing
out of a cattle firm because of ill health, the four sons of the other
partner, the taxpayer, were given a one-half interest in order to pre-
serve intact the brood herd. The sale of this interest to the sons was
accomplished by a note which was largely paid by (1) a gift from the
taxpayer, and (2) a loan procured by the newly formed Culbertson &
Sons partnership. Since the sons were in the Army and in college
during the tax years, no substantial services were rendered. The Tax
Court taxed the entire income to the father; the Fifth Circuit reversed,
holding it enough that the sons intended to contribute their efforts to
the business in the future. The Supreme Court rejected both inter-
pretations and remanded the cause to the Tax Court. Tax validity was
made to turn on an issue of whether, in consideration of all the facts,
"the parties in good faith and acting with a business purpose intended
to join together in the present conduct of the enterprise."10  True,
absence of evidence of the old determinative factors has the effect of
placing a heavy burden in proving bona fide intent, but presence or
absence of any or all of these factors is no longer controlling."' This
much is made clear: original capital is not essential; intent may be
predicated upon investment of an intra-family gift. It is uncertain
how far reaching the effects will be. Significant indeed is the recent
statement of a distinguished circuit judge: "The Commissioner asserts
that Culbertson represents an affirmation of the rationale of Tower and
Lusthaus. We doubt the validity of this contention."' 2
What are the basic criteria, considered separately, which go to prove
or tefeat a bona fide intent to form a "business purpose" partnership?
Capital contribution. Origination of the capital with the incoming
family member, while no longer a requirement, is of great evidentiary
value in proving that there is in fact a valid contribution rather than a
sham paper reallocation. Capital from the personal estate of the osten-
sible partner is the most readily acceptable.'8 If the source is a prior
10 Culbertson v. Comm'r., 69 Sup. Ct. 1210, 1216 (1949).
"A reading of a portion of the opinion without reference to the decision in its
entirety may well lead to the conclusion that either contribution of capital or
rendition of services within the tax year is still essential; to wit: "if it is con-
ceded that some of the partners contributed neither capital nor services to the
partnership during the tax years in question. . . it can hardly be contended that
they are in any way responsible for the production of income during those years."
(p. 1213). Clearly, this is dictum which a literal minded Tax Court could seize
upon to justify a continuation of their previous line of reasoning.
" Major, Chief Cir. Judge, in Greenberger v. Comm'r., 5 CCH 1949 FED. TAX
REP. §9454 (7th Cir. 1949).
1" Canfield v. Comm'r., 168 F. 2d 907 (6th Cir. 1948) (inheritance) ; Weizer v.
Comm'r., 165 F. 2d 772 (6th Cir. 1948) (insurance policy) ; Florence R. Miller,




gift of money from the taxpayer, recognition seems most often to de-
pend on whether it is anticipatory to the formation of the partnership. 14
It is enough that the contribution to the business was made some years
prior to the tax year.' 5  Contributions in the form of notes payable
out of the profits of the partnership or by a gift from the taxpayer have
not generally been held sufficient.1 6 Nor have contributions of proceeds
from a gift of stock in a predecessor corporation donated in anticipation
of the creation of the partnership satisfied the test in most cases.' 7
Vital services.'8 The following considerations are germane to this
test: (1) relative importance in the scheme of the business ;19 (2) com-
petence of the family member by way of special training and practical
experience ;20 (3) reliance placed on the judgment and position of the
alleged partner;21 (4) status as more than a mere employee who
receives wages periodically.
In a partnership which is chiefly one of personal service it is more
essential that the family member stand in the shoes of any other partner
who holds an interest by his service. At times the Tax Court has been
prone, unrealistically, it is believed, to label services of a family member
as "wifely assistance" or "voluntary"-a mere filial or marital duty.22
Thus, it is incumbent on the taxpayer's attorney to negative this impli-
1 See Greenberger v. Comm'r., 5 CCH 1949 FED. TAx REP,. §9454 (7th Cir.
1949).
Graber v. Comm'r., 171 F. 2d 32 (10th Cir. 1949).18Lusthaus v. Comm'r., 327 U.S. 293 (1946) (profits); Boyd v. Comm'r., 171
F. 2d 546 (6th Cir. 1949) (gift) ; Hougland v. Comm'r., 166 F. 2d 815 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 334 U.S. 846 (1948) (profits). But where basis is a loan secured by
the partnership, Culbertson will direct a different result.
"' Comm'r. v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280 (1946) ; Scherf v. Comm'r, 161 F. 2d 495(5th Cir. 1947) ; Maudlin v. Comm'r., 155 F. 2d 666 (4th Cir. 1946). Test satis-
fied where gift of stock was not anticipatory in Lawton v. Commissioner, 164
F. 2d 380 (6th Cir. 1947).
"a Notice use of phrase, "valuable services," Graber v. Comm'r., 171 F. 2d 32(10th Cir. 1949) ; "substantial services," Wilson v. Comm'r., 161 F. 2d 661 (7th
Cir. 1947).!"Not sufficiently important: Edwin F. Sandburg, 8 T. C. 423 (1947) (han-
dling invoices, collecting rents, answering phones) ; Davis v. United States, 5
CCH 1949 FED. TAx REP. §9349 (6th Cir. 1949) (writing occasional letters, making
bank deposits); Dewey F. Cobb, 5 CCH FED. TAx REP. §7613 (T. C. 1949) (part
time work).
Office work in a supervisory capacity is increasingly being given cognizance.
Ron W. Wood, 5 CCH 1949 FED. TAx REP. §7413 (M) (T. C. 1949) (main-
tenance of business records, custody of funds, hiring of personnel) ; David L.
Jennings, 10 T. C. 505 (1948).
Of vital importance: William Grace, 10 T. C. 1 (1948) (employing and dis-
charging personnel, sales promotion, closing sales contracts).
o Son received college training for the j.ob: Culbertson -V. Comm'r., 69 Sup. Ct.
1210 (1949); Lawton v. Comm'r., 164 F. 2d 380 (6th Cir. 1947). Commerce
school partnership valid where wife better qualified than taxpayer husband because
of training and experience: Allen v. Knott, 166 F. 2d 798 (5th Cir. 1948).
"' Woosley v. Comm'r., 168 F. 2d 330 (6th Cir. 1948); S. B. Forsythe, 10
T. C. 417 (1948) (taxpayer illiterate).
22 E.g., most recently, H. V. Funai, 5 CCH 1949 FED. TAx REP. §7670 (T. C.
1949).
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cation with clarity. It is suggested that an inference of "filial aid" is
less apparent. Services during the tax year are most acceptable; future
services are ineffective, asserts Culbertson-although in view of the
Culbertson standard of bona fide intent this is open to some doubt.
There are indications that services prior to tax years are influential.238
Receipt and use of the profits. A separate bookkeeping entry and
segregation of funds, as by creation of a separate bank account, are
persuasive indicia.2 4 The partner must have unhampered use of his
earnings. Status is doubtful where proceeds though credited to the
family member must remain in the business, or cannot be withdrawn
without the taxpayer's consent,25 or where the use of the income is
controlled by the taxpayer.2 6 Some cases state that'if the family mem-
ber, especially the wife, uses the income to purchase family necessaries,
the income is not truly that of the family member 2 7-a position not
exempt from attack. The rule purported to be followed is that there
must be a substantial change in the economic relationship among the
family members and in the dominion over the business.
Management and control. What voice does the ostensible partner
have in policy formation and the direction of business affairs (as dis-
tinguished from services) ?28 Where there has been an outright gift
of the interest in the firm, the absence of any participation in the man-
agement may serve to 'defeat division of income. 29 The right to repur-
chase the interest either at original value or value at the time of re-
purchase is indicative of lack of control by the alleged partner.80
Form of the agreement. The form of the agreement is not so im-
portant as the fact of the agreement. It cannot be an afterthought.
Oral agreements have been held effective,31 but the existence of a formal
written partnership agreement is of strong evidentiary value to mani-
" E.g., Wenig v. Comm'r., 5 CCH 1949 FED. TAX REP. §9348 (D. C. Cir. 1949) ;
Singletary v. Comm'r., 155 F. 2d 207 (5th Cir. 1946) (wife did little during tax
year due to birth of child).
' Canfield v. Comm'r., 168 F. 2d 907 (6th Cir. 1948); Appel v. Smith, 161
F. 2d 121 (7th Cir. 1947).
2 Economos v. Comm'r., 167 F. 2d 165 (4th Cir. 1948).28E.g., Jerry Maiatico, 12 T. C 146 (1949).
7Wilson v. Comm'r., 161 F. 2d 661 (7th Cir. 1947) ; Dewey F. Cobb, 5 CCH
1949 FED. TAX R.EP. §7613 (T. C. 1949).28Validity upheld: Emanuel Greenwald, 5 CCH 1948 FED. TAX REP. §7428 (M)
(T. C. 1948) (Even though the agreement provided that the taxpayer should have
exclusive control, in actuality the son did large part of buying and selling.) ; Hewett
Grocery Co., 5 CCH 1949 FED. TAX REIP. §7264(M) (T. C. 1949). Validity denied:
Delong v. Allen, 5 CCH 1948 FED. TAX REP. §9326 (M. D. Ga. 1948) (taxpayer
controlled personnel, handled purchasing, borrowed money, disposed of assets-
without the consent of the others).2 Fletcher v. Comm'r., 164 F. 2d 182 (2d Cir. 1947).
'0 Davis v. United States, 5 CCH 1949 FED. TAX REP. §9349 (6th Cir. 1949)
(agreement: "absolute, unquestioned right at any time he [taxpayer] may desire,
to purchase the one-tenth interest").21Weizer v. Comm'r., 165 F. 2d 722 (6th Cir. 1948); Walsh v. Shaughnessy,
77 F. Supp. 577 (N. D. N. Y. 1948).
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fest an intent to form a partnership.3 2 The written agreement, however
may be unfortunate if it includes statements which the Tax Court can
seize upon as indicative of a "mere paper reallocation." Also, the court
may conceivably look upon the technical intricacies of the articles of
agreement as form without substance skillfully drawn to give appearance
of reality when the draftsman's purpose is tax avoidance.
Business motive may be further manifested by: (1) proper notifica-
tion of the existence of the partnership to or recognition by parties
doing business with the firm or inclusion of the family member in the
trade name, tested by the query: was it known to the world as a partner-
ship?; (2) improvement of credit standing by inclusion of family mem-
ber's personal liability-absent original contribution of capital;33 (3)
interest in perpetuating the business in the family by training the part-
ner someday to assume full control; (4) interest in securing fuller
cooperation in the present operation of the business by giving family
member responsibility of partnership standing; (5) request by family
member to be made a partner, or demand by other partner or business
associate outside of the family;34 (6) reasonable proportion between
share of earnings and the income producing value of the contribution
made to the firm ;35 and (7) consistency in treatment of all phases of
the purported partnership in regard to the family arrangement.
What is the effect of a tax avoidance motive? The answer is one
of uncertainty since the language used by the courts often seems incon-
sistent with the results reached. Clearly, evidence of a tax avoidance
motive has often been the elusive straw that broke the partnership's
back. This result may be rationalized by saying that it operates in a
negative fashion, militating against bona fide intent to do business in
the partnership form; though it may be that freedom from the tax
avoidance motive should baldly be listed among the requirements of
tax validity. Courts still pay lip service to the principle that the tax-
payer may reduce his tax burden by any legal means,3 6 but the Tax
Court seldom foregoes an opportunity to "pierce the shroud" and lay
" Singletary v. Comm'r., 155 F. 2d 207 (5th Cir. 1946) ; Alexander Jarvis, 5
CCH 1946 FED. TAX REP. §7519 (M) (T. C. 1946).
"Hartz v. Comm'r., 170 F. 2d 313 (8th Cir. 1948).
Culbertson v. Comm'r., 69 Sup. Ct. 1210 (1949).
"A unique development is the reallocation by the Tax Court, in disregard of
the express provisions of the articles of partnership, of the income according to
the relative income producing value of the partner's contribution. Robinson, The
Allocation Theory in Family Partnership Cases, 25 TAXES 963 (1947). But in
view of the rejection of this judicial contract-writing by the circuit courts in
Canfield v. Comm'r., 168 F. 2d 907 (6th Cir. 1948), and Woosley v. Comm'r.,
168 F. 2d 330 (6th Cir. 1948), the process of reallocation may have been abated.
In addition, the court has recognized certain participants in the agreement and
not others, selecting those around whom the halo of bona fide intent glows most
brightly. W. F. Harmon, 5 CCH 1949 FED. TAX REP. §7596 (T. C. 1949); R. C.
Hitchcock, 12 T. C. 22 (1949).
" Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935).
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bare an attempt to escape the tax burden.' It is submitted that the
distinction should be more clearly delineated between tax avoidance as
a primary or sole aim, which may negate business purpose, and tax
avoidance as a concomitant or secondary result, which is not relevant
to Tax Court findings.3 8
It has often been stated that validity of the partnership under state
law has no bearing on tax recognition. The effect, however, of validity
under commercial rules on tax determination could quite conceivably be
changing. It is arguable that, since under a partnership recognized by
the local law, the separate property of the family member in the event
of insolvency is liable for the satisfaction of partnership debts ;30 and
since the member is entitled to his portion of the assets in event of dis-
solution,40 there are present the necessary elements of reality, business
purpose, and change in domination which are demanded. 41 Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in Culbertson asserts that Tower "did not purport to an-
nounce a special concept of 'partnership' for tax purposes differing from
the concept that rules in ordinary commercial law cases. ' 4 2
Treatment of the problem by the courts since Culbertson is signifi-
cant. Although many questions are left unanswered, several clear in-
dications are discernible.
1. By and large the courts have accepted the change in emphasis,
required by the Supreme Court, from exclusive determinative tests
to a consideration of all factors revealing intent.43
2. If capital contribution is relied upon, it need not be original with
the family member; effect is given though the source is a prior ir-
revocable gift from the taxpayer.44
3. Although the result does not necessarily follow, in practical ef-
fect a partnership which would have been valid before Culbertson
will likely be valid now.
4. Absent other factors, an outright gift of an interest is still in-
effective. 45
"E.g., Grayson v. Deal, 5 CCH 1949 FED. TAx REP. §9408 (N. D. Ala. 1949).
" It is logically arguable, however, that a real partnership may be intended and
formed though the sole motivation is tax avoidance, since the reality of the product
is more the issue than the mental attitude which originally led the taxpayer to put
the machinery into operation.
" UNIFORM PARTNESHIp Ace, §15 (unless the liability is limited).
40 UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP Acr, §38. 4" Note, 46 COL. L. REv. 677 (1946).
" Culbertson v. Comm'r., 69 Sup. Ct. 1210, 1218 (1949).
"But cf. W. S. Barrett, 5 CCH 1949 FED. TAX REP. §7631 (T. C. 1949).
"Edw. A. Theurkauf, 5 CCH 1949 FED. TAX REP. §7626 (T. C. 1949) (prob-
ably the high water mark of Tax Court liberality-gift of stock to wife; within
one month she contributed proceeds to newly formed partnership) ; Greenberger v.
Comm'r., 5 CCH 1949 FED. TAX REP. §9454 (7th Cir. 1949); Atkins v. United
States, 5 CCH 1949 Fm. TAX REP. §9407 (W. D. La. 1949) ; Joseph Middlebrook,
5 CCH 1949 FED. TAx REP. §7597 (T. C. 1949). But cf. Lowry v. Comm'r., 154
F. 2d 448 (6th Cir. 1946) (pre-Cuibertson).
"Rocco J. Cardone, 5 CCH 1949 FFD. TAX REP. §7584(M) (T. C. 1949).
But cf. Ginsburg v. Arnold, 5 CCH 1949 FED. TAx REP. §9396 (5th Cir. 1949).
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5. Evidence of tax avoidance motive may still be fatal 4 6
6. Generally the courts have caught the spirit of Culbertson re-
markably well. Although numerical weight settles nothing, it may
be noted that the majority of decisions since Culbertson have been
favorable to the taxpayer; decidedly the opposite was true pre-
viously.
Two cases which seem to prescribe typically the limits under Cul-
bertson deserve special notice. The court in Morrison v. Cominis-
sioner4T denied validity where, though the formalities of agreement were
indulged in, the taxpayer retained domination over the business, provid-
ing no separation of earnings nor power of ostensible partners to draw
checks on the account. In Ginsberg v. Arnold4" the interest of the son
was a direct gift; the father exercised control over the writing of checks;
the son was in the Army during the tax years. Yet on rehearing the
circuit court found an intent to create a partnership for the benefit of
the business.
In order to encourage this socially desirable method of perpetuating
the family business; in order to reduce the inequality in the effect given
intra-family transfers within corporations and in partnerships;49 in
order to recognize the very real consequences of a genuine commercial
partnership, perhaps parent-child partnership will be viewed more fa-
vorably by the courts under the impetus of the Culbertson case.50
HUBERT B. HuMPHREY, JR.
Torts--Unborn Child-Right of Action
for Prenatal Injury
A search through the North Carolina Digest, Reports, and Anno-
tated General Statutes has disclosed no North Carolina case in which
an action has been brought by or on behalf of a child for prenatal in-
juries. A probable reason for this situation is that, by the decided pre-
ponderance of case authority, no right of action has been recognized for
"Grayson v. Deal, 5 CCH 1949 FED. TAx RzP. §9408 (N. D. Ala. 1949).
'7 5 CCH 1949 FED. TAX REP. §9436 (2d Cir. 1949).
AS5 CCH 1949 FED. TAx REP. §9396 (5th Cir. 1949), vacating on rehearing 5
CCH 1949 FED. TAx REP. §9381 (5th Cir.); accord: 0. H. Delchamps, 5 CCH
1949 FED. TAX REP. §7560 (T. C. 1949). But cf. Lusthaus v. Comm'r., 327 U.S.
293 (1946).
' There is evidence, however, of the beginnings of a movement to reduce the
transfer rights within a corporation to the partnership level. See Alexandre, The
Corporate Counterpart of the Family Partnership, 2 TAx L. REv. 493 (1947).
" Congressional action has been suggested to tax the income of parents and
minor children as a unit or to deal with the family partnership problem as a whole.
See Wales, The 1949 Relevance of the Revenue Bill of 1948, 62 HARv. L. REv.
957, 972-74 (1949).
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